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Perhaps the central issue raised by the contemporary public law system is
the nature of the relationship between law, courts, and lawyering, on the one
hand, and politics and policymaking, on the other. The results of the 1992
election render this concern even more salient.' One cannot rule out the kind
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1. For the first time since 1933, the same party controls the Presidency and both houses of Congress
after a long period (twelve years in both cases) during which the other party had the opportunity to appoint
much of the federal judiciary. Indeed the expansion of, and turnover within, the judiciary during the
Reagan-Bush years meant that, between them, the two Presidents appointed nearly 600 judges (the total
number of federal judgeships is 828). On the other hand, the accumulation of an unusually large backlog
of judicial vacancies, coupled with a continuing high turnover rate, is expected to give President Clinton
the opportunity to name many more judges to the federal bench during his first term than President Bush
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of fierce interbranch conflicts over constitutional and statutory interpretation
that occurred after the elections of 1800 and 1932, although for a variety of
reasons they seem unlikely. The academic legal commentary concerning the
connection between law, politics, and policy is remarkable in one respect:
almost all of it is nonnative in character, consisting of arguments that proceed
from one or another conception of justice (often asserted rather than defended).
These arguments purport to imply or justify some ideal role for lawyers, law,
and courts in the construction of social policy. Rebellious Lawyering2 is a
book very much in this tradition, advancing strong claims about how lawyers
and clients should relate to one another and to the local cultures and
institutions that hold power over them.
Most of the academic legal commentary, however, is preoccupied, even
obsessed, with the role of courts in legal reform. This line of inquiry invites
an obvious follow-up question: to what extent do these normative theories
accurately reflect what courts do, and how courts affect social reality?
Regrettably, legal scholars seldom ask (much less answer) this question, a fact
that should dismay all of us who believe that empirical reality must inform the
normative theories that we embrace and teach our students.3 Fortunately,
scholars in other disciplines have attempted to fill the enormous void which
we, for reasons that are not altogether clear,4 have created and then tolerated.
Virtually all of the work in this area has been by political scientists.5
The Hollow Hope,6 by lawyer and political scientist Gerald Rosenberg,
represents the most recent contribution to this small but exceedingly
stimulating and valuable literature. Rosenberg contrasts his book with previous
studies of reform litigation which, he says, have "not squarely centered on
whether, and under what conditions, courts produce significant social
reform."7 This claim exhibits the common scholarly conceit of uniqueness, but
did, and almost as many as President Reagan did in his two terms. Stephen Labaton, Clinton Expected to
Change Makeup of Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 1993, at Al; Henry J. Reske, Molding the
Courts, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 20.
2. GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW
PRACTICE (1992) [hereinafter referred to as L6pEz].
3. There are, however, exceptions. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID HARFST, THE STRUGGLE
FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990).
4. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J.
LEGAL EDuc. 323 (1989).
5. A number of these political scientists are, however, legally trained or teach in law schools. For
example, Martin Shapiro teaches at Berkeley's law school, Boalt Hall, though he has no law degree; Donald
Horowitz holds a joint appointment at Duke; Gerald Rosenberg received a law degree from Michigan and
a Ph.D. in political science from Yale, and teaches both political science and law at the University of
Chicago.
6. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)
[hereinafter referred to as ROSENBERG].
7. ROSENBERG at 9. Rosenberg cites, but dismisses, the study by Michael A. Rebell and Arthur R.
Block, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL AcTIVISM
(1982), because it is concerned with "admittedly non-controversial areas," ROSENBERG at 10, an odd way
to characterize disputes over urban school policies. See also id. at 29.
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in this case it is, quite simply, false. It ignores, for example, two relatively
recent, well-known, book-length studies published by the Brookings Institution
on the effectiveness of court-driven reform-books that Rosenberg cites
elsewhere in his study.8 It also ignores a sizable political science literature on
the inherent difficulties of policy implementation. This implementation
literature applies, mutatis mutandis, to court-initiated policies as well as to
legislative or administrative ones, and already makes all of Rosenberg's
theoretical points.9 Rosenberg's omissions are highly regrettable as a scholarly
matter, and they merit criticism.'0 Nonetheless, The Hollow Hope is an
8. The first Brookings book was Donald L. Horowitz's detailed, theoretically informed empirical case
studies of reform litigation, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977). Indeed, three of Horowitz's case
studies involve courts' effects on school desegregation, criminal procedure, and juvenile justice, id. at 106-
70, 220-54, 171-219-areas that Rosenberg examines in The Hollow Hope. (Ironically, Horowitz's book
was itself criticized for having failed to cite earlier social science studies on the subject. See Stephen L.
Wasby, Book Review, 31 VAND. L. REv. 727, 733, 740 (1978)).
The second Brookings book was R. Shep Melnick's equally detailed study of environmental
regulation, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983) [hereinafter
MELNICK, REGULATION]. A new book by Melnick, THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RIGHTS: THE COURTS
AND CONGRESS IN THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author)
[hereinafter MELNICK, STATUTORY RIGHTS], was unavailable (except, perhaps, in manuscript) when
Rosenberg's book went to press. Rosenberg may believe that these books do not meet his criteria. If so,
he does not explain why. Perhaps it is because they are case studies rather than systematic, rigorous,
empirical analyses; given the limitations of their methodologies, they cannot really isolate the precise
contributions of the courts in those cases.
An earlier classic in the field that takes a view roughly similar to Rosenberg's-ROBERT MCCLOSKEY,
THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960)-is never specifically cited, although it is included in the general
bibliography. In addition, Rosenberg neither cites nor includes in his bibliography a number of other studies
of the implementation of particular Supreme Court decisions. For example he omits the literature on school
prayer, see School DisL v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), which includes KENNETH M. DOLBEARE &
PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE
(1971); WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LAW AND ATTITUDE CHANGE (1967).
9. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME (1977); JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN &
AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (1973); Richard Elmore, Organizational Models of Social Program
Implementation, 26 PUB. POL'Y 185 (1978); Joel F. Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare
Administration, in THE LAW OF THE POOR 155 (Jacobus tenBroek ed., 1966); Peter H. Schuck, Regulation:
Asking the Right Questions, NAT'L J., Apr. 28, 1979, at 711; Symposium on Successful Policy
Implementation, 8 POL'Y STUD. J. 531 (1980); Donald S. Van Meter & Carl E. Van Horn, The Policy
Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework, 6 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 445 (1975); Richard Weatherly
& Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special-Education
Reform, 47 HARV. EDUC. REv. 171 (1977).
10. Thus, I am puzzled by Professor Powe's apparent effort, in his review of Rosenberg's book, to
excuse this failing. Powe observes that fundamentally "Rosenberg's theory is not an implementation theory"
and that "the earlier implementation studies are not well known." L.A. Powe, Jr., The Supreme Court,
Social Change, and Legal Scholarship, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1615, 1631 (1992) (reviewing LEE C.
BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS (1991) and The Hollow Hope). Whatever Rosenberg's theory
purports to be, it is plainly a theory about the conditions under which courts seeking to initiate or reinforce
social change can "effectively" do so--that is, can implement such change, alone or in combination with
other forces. And even if Powe's assertion that implementation studies are not well known is true of the
general public, this ignorance is either false or irrelevant insofar as social scientists and legal scholars
choosing to write in the field are concerned. In either event, it is their duty to know about and, where
germane to their arguments, to discuss such studies. In this spirit, Powe observes at the end of his review
that lawyers should read more social science; indeed, he criticizes a law professor (whose book was also
under review) for having failed to do so. Id. at 1641. This criticism must be all the more damning when
applied to another social scientist.
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important addition to the field, one that all public lawyers and political
scientists will read with great profit.
II. REBELLIOUS LAWYERING
Rebellious Lawyering, by law professor and legal activist Gerald L6pez,
addresses a quite different question than that examined by The Hollow Hope:
how should a "progressive" or "public interest" lawyer" conduct herself both
personally and professionally"2 in order to advance the cause of social
change? Although this question about modes of lawyering is of direct interest
to a much smaller group than that addressed by Rosenberg, the two books are
related in at least three important respects. First, L6pez's principal audience
consists of a set of actors who initiate much of the "public law litigation"'3
that is Rosenberg's subject. Second, and more interestingly, L6pez seems to
share much of Rosenberg's skepticism about the capacity of such litigation to
bring about enduring social change.'
4
A third, and more damning, commonality is this: although the notion of
"social change" lies at the heart of both books-for Rosenberg it is the
dependent variable being analyzed, while for L6pez it is the goal of
progressive lawyering-neither book has much to say about its substantive or
programmatic content, and neither offers a theory of what causes social
change. Rosenberg defines it as "policy change with a nationwide impact"
affecting "large groups of people."'15  It is, he says, liberal change.' 6
Although he does not detail what this means, he implies that it has a decidedly
egalitarian, and presumably statist, character. 7 He explicitly renounces any
11. These labels are used interchangeably throughout the book. They are, of course, somewhat
tendentious and self-serving, which is why I put them in quotes. But they are no more so than other labels
used by political groups on both the right and the left-for example, "pro-life," "pro-choice," and
"libertarian"-which seek to show membership on the side of the angels.
12. L6pez seems to be making the claim that, for these lawyers at least, the two spheres should be
integrated-that their personal values and their professional behavior must be consistent. This is interesting
but not obviously correct. One argument that might be made against it, for example, is that a lawyer must
maintain a certain distance between herself and her client if she is to furnish the sound, professional
judgment to which the client is entitled.
13. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
14. I say "seems to" because lpez offers no systematic explanation of what actually constitutes the
"social change" to which progressive lawyers should bend their efforts. See infra text immediately
following this note.
15. ROSENBERG at 4.
16. Id. at xi. This is presumably because the Court decisions that he discusses, all in the pre-Reagan
years, have generally been characterized as "liberal." He gives no hint as to how his account of judicial
effectiveness would have to be altered if more "conservative" changes of the sort sought by the Rehnquist
Court were the objects of analysis. This omission is unfortunate.
17. He defines social change as "the broadening and equalizing of the possession and enjoyment of
what are commonly perceived as basic goods in American society." Id. at 4. Drawing on John Rawls'
expansive conception, he speaks of "political goods such as participation in the political process and
freedom of speech and association; legal goods such as equal and non-discriminatory treatment of all
people; material goods; and self-respect, the opportunity for every individual to lead a satisfying and worthy
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intention to supply a "full blown" theory of what brings social change about,
although he does attempt to "assess a host of social, political, and economic
changes that could plausibly have led to significant social reform independent
of court action."'"
L6pez is even more Delphic about what constitutes and causes social
change. Since his book seeks to instruct lawyers about how to help their clients
and communities produce it, this is an astonishing omission.' 9 The reader is
simply left to infer from several clues what progressive change is, and how it
comes about: the facts L6pez uses in his fictional case studies,20 the groups
that he wants progressive lawyers to work with and represent,2" and the
evocative terms that he uses as synonyms for injustice.'
L6pez's vivid elaboration of his ideas about progressive legal practice-his
"rebellious idea of lawyering against subordination"23--constitutes a bold,
potentially far-reaching challenge to what he considers the standard practice
mode of legal services lawyers, which he calls "the regnant idea of the lawyer
for the subordinated." 24 His preferred model, which he characterizes as
"teaching self-help and lay lawyering," 25 contrasts even more sharply with the
brand of "public interest law" practiced by organizations such as the Public
Citizen Litigation Group, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
the Center for Law in the Public Interest, and the Washington Legal
Foundation. These organizations, about which L6pez says little, typically are
highly professionalized large-city groups strongly oriented toward (and often
partly funded by) major impact litigation, which is conducted by lawyers
trained at elite law schools who enjoy high status and visibility. Such groups
tend to have only the most formalistic relationships with their clients,
organizational or individual, and engage in little or no community organizing;
life." Id. (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42, 440 (1971)).
18. Id. at 8.
19. Although L6pez insists (through the mouth of a fictional community organizer) that one must have
a vision of the "good life" that includes "a view of the state," he fails to offer even a hint of what such a
view would look like. L6PEz at 377. A page later, the organizer says that one must also be "programmatic."
Id. at 378. Again, however, L6pez never mentions, much less defends, any specific agenda.
20. L6pez states at the outset: "Everything I describe is fictional." Id. at 8. His fictional case studies
include legalization efforts on behalf of undocumented aliens, landlord-tenant disputes, the operation of a
community law office, disability claims, racial discrimination, and community organizing around a variety
of issues. He also refers to the practitioners he describes as "poverty lawyers." Id. at 20.
21. These groups include "women, low-income people, people of color, gays and lesbians, the
disabled, and the elderly." Id. at 37.
22. The most prominent example is "subordination," which he uses to refer generally to a sense of
powerlessness but which otherwise remains essentially undefined. See id. at 11-82 (ch. I), passim. He also
writes of "efforts to fundamentally change the world," id. at 10, without indicating what this means or
entails.
23. Id. at 37.
24. Id. at 11. L6pez lists twelve characteristics of the "regnant idea" of such lawyering, including
formal representation of clients, an emphasis on litigation, and situating the lawyer as primary problem-
solver. Id. at 23-24.
25. Id. at 70.
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they are concerned with client empowerment in only a narrow, legal rights-
oriented sense.26
The role of these other modes of legal activism in L6pez's world of
progressive lawyering remains unclear. Is there room there for the "regnant"
and litigation-oriented forms of lawyering? Or are these instead merely
degenerate forms which, even when they appear to succeed, further
disempower people-both by placing professionals between them and the
levers of enduring change, and by fostering the illusion that legal rights are the
raw materials of self-actualization? To what extent are these other forms
inevitable concessions to limited reformist resources and economies of scale,
to the increasing importance of technical and professional know-how in
influencing public and private decisionmakers, and to other such realities?
These questions raise some poignant ethical and tactical dilemmas, and
L6pez exhibits a good deal of sensitivity to some of these issues as they arise
in his imaginary practice settings.27 But he does not thoroughly canvass or
articulate the competing considerations, and his normative assessments rest
essentially on plausible but largely unexamined intuitions about human nature
and social dynamics, intuitions that he imparts through the storytelling genre
now in vogue among some legal scholars.28 He prefers to argue from ipse
dixit and personal reflection than from extended, disciplined analysis or
available empirical evidence.29
The remainder of this Book Review is mostly about The Hollow Hope. My
reason for confining my discussion in this way, however, is certainly not that
Rebellious Lawyering is devoid of interest. In fact, it is an engagingly written,
insightful, often moving argument in favor of a distinctive conception of
professional responsibility by progressive lawyers: more humane, engaged,
client-centered, self-abnegating, unheroic, and situational. All lawyers,
26. For descriptions of such groups, see ANDREW S. MCFARLAND, COMMON CAUSE: LOBBYING IN
THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1984); ANDREW S. MCFARLAND, PUBLIC INTEREST LOBBIES: DECISIONMAKING ON
ENERGY (1976); Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28
STAN. L. REv. 207 (1976); Peter H. Schuck, The Nader Chronicles, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 1455 (1972)
(reviewing ROBERT F. BUCKHORN, NADER: THE PEOPLE'S LAWYER (1972) and CHARLES MCCARRY,
CITIZEN NADER (1972)).
27. See, e.g., L6PEZ at 14, 18.
28. This genre is especially popular among law professors interested in critical race theory, feminism,
literary theory, and related modes of legal theory. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists
and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989). For a recent critique of the storytelling
genre, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narrative,
45 STAN. L. REV 807 (1993). L6pez defends the narrative approach, L6PEz at 39-44, and uses it
throughout.
29. Notably absent from his discussion, for example, is any explicit reference to the extensive
empirical law-and-society literature on lawyer-client interactions. He does, however, list several such studies
in an unannotated bibliography at the end of the book, including, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER
AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974); Austin Sarat, '... The Law Is All Over': Power Resistance and
the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990); Austin Sarat & William
L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J.
1663 (1989); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 93 (1986).
Public Law Litigation
progressive or not, should take up this challenge, for it invites us to
"disenthrall ourselves," to "think anew" 30 about how and why we live in the
law as we do.
III. THE HOLLOW HOPE
Methodologically, The Hollow Hope could hardly be more different from
Rebellious Lawyering. In sharp contrast to L6pez's highly confessional,
normative, sometimes epistolary mode,3' Rosenberg draws heavily on the
kinds of data and analytical techniques that social scientists conventionally
use.32 His principal claims are empirical; he purports to be concerned only
with the fact of judicial effectiveness in producing social change, not with
normative judgments about what constitutes desirable change or what the
courts' posture toward change ought to be.33 Commendably, he lays out these
claims for all to see, appraise, and criticize. Such an appraisal is my project in
the remainder of this Book Review.
Generally speaking, we may distinguish three kinds of scholarly views
34
concerning the effectiveness of court-driven approaches in producing
significant social reform.35 Those I shall call "strong-court" scholars believe
that the courts are often effective reformers by reason of their unique
institutional features, especially their relative independence from electoral and
bureaucratic politics. "Court skeptics" hold that court-directed reform, although
not inevitably doomed to failure, is highly problematic. They argue that the
most significant effects of such efforts are likely to be unanticipated and often
perverse. "Court fatalists" maintain that the effectiveness of social reform
depends on factors that courts can perhaps reinforce, but to which they are
otherwise either irrelevant or epiphenomenal.36
These three views do not correspond to the conventional, often
reductionist, polarities of left and right. Most strong-court scholars are liberal;
they emphasize the courts' superior ability to articulate and instantiate public
30. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, [Second] Annual Message to Congress (December 1, 1862) reprinted in 5
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 518, 537 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
31. L6pez makes many of his points through the literary device of fictional memoranda from lawyers,
legal investigators, etc. See, e.g., L6PEz at 145.
32. But while conventional, these techniques are also quite rudimentary by the standards of quantitative
social science. Rosenberg's tables and figures, for example, use simple comparisons of absolute numbers
rather than more complex statistics, regressions, or other forms of multivariate analysis.
33. ROSENBERG at xi. Of course, how one defines and measures effectiveness is not simply a matter
of objective fact but inescapably involves some value judgments.
34. These are more akin to perspectives than to articulated, systematic theories.
35. Rosenberg uses the phrase "significant social reform" to apply to nationwide changes in
bureaucratic or institutional practices. ROSENBERG at 4. One could quarrel with this definition, but it will
serve for purposes of the present discussion. See also supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
36. One can be both a skeptic and a fatalist. My colleague Jerry Mashaw places himself in this camp,
finding judicial intervention under some circumstances to combine "[i]mpertinence and irrelevance" to
social reality. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS 4 (1983).
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values in the face of what they regard as political and bureaucratic abdications.
But some-Robert Bork, for example-are militantly conservative. Like the
liberals, conservative strong-court scholars believe that court-initiated change
is often effective. For precisely that reason, however, they denounce such
change, arguing that it is institutionally illegitimate, constitutes lamentable
public policy, or both.
The first two views are already well-represented in the literature. Strong-
court scholars include commentators like Bork, Owen Fiss, Abram Chayes, and
Michael Rebell and Arthur Block.37 Skeptics are even more numerous;
examples include Donald Horowitz, Jeremy Rabkin, Colin Diver, Shep
Melnick, Robert Katzmann, and myself. 38 Fatalists, however, are a rarer
breed, at least in recent years39 as popular and professional ambitions for the
judicial enterprise, nurtured by the Warren Court during the 1960's and state
court expansions of liability law in the 1970's and early 1980's, have grown.
Although The Hollow Hope sometimes approaches mainstream skepticism, its
general thrust is emphatically fatalistic. Thus, Rosenberg in his concluding
chapter states that "U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of
significant social reform. At best, they can second the social reform acts of the
other branches of government."4 With the publication of The Hollow Hope,
Rosenberg becomes the leading contemporary exponent of court fatalism.
Rosenberg sets forth his version of fatalism by contrasting what he calls
the "Dynamic Court" view (roughly corresponding to what I have called the
strong-court view)41 with a "Constrained Court" view, in which the courts are
"weak, ineffective, and powerless. 42 It is hard, however, to think of a single
scholar today who adheres to the constrained court view as Rosenberg defines
it, nor does he cite any. His organizing scheme, moreover, does absolutely no
analytical work for him; indeed, he quickly suggests that both views are partly
37. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAw (1990); REBELL & BLOCK, supra note 7; Chayes, supra note 13; Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court
1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
38. See generally HOROWrrZ, supra note 8; ROBERT A. KATZMANN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY: THE
SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION POLICY FOR THE DISABLED (1986); MELNICK, REGULATION, supra note 8;
MELNICK, STATUTORY RIGHTS, supra note 8; JEREMY A. RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: How PUBLIC
LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY (1989); PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR
OFFICIAL WRONGS 147-81 (1983) [hereinafter SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT]; Colin S. Diver, The Judge
As Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43
(1979); Peter H. Schuck, The New Judicial Ideology of Tort Law, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW
(Walter Olson ed., 1988).
39. Perhaps the greatest fatalist, though certainly an unconventional one, was Justice Holmes. See
Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHl. L. REV. 213 (1964). I thank Owen Fiss for suggesting
the Holmes example.
40. ROSENBERG at 338.
41. In Rosenberg's words, the Dynamic Court view "sees courts as powerful, vigorous, and potent
proponents of change." Id. at 2.
42. Id. at 3. Rosenberg intends to confine the contrast to the reform litigation context. "[T]here is no
clash between the two views in dealing with individuals." Id. at 5. Although he does not discuss the fact
that reform cases are often concerned with, and initiated by, individuals, he surely recognizes it.
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correct and must therefore be combined to produce a refined understanding of
the courts' role. The dichotomy thus turns out to be little more than a
temporary placeholder for Rosenberg's own theory, which borrows from each
of its halves.n3
Merging his "Dynamic" and "Constrained" court views, Rosenberg
produces a theory of the conditions under which courts produce significant
social reform. The effectiveness of courts, he postulates, is limited by three
structural constraints: (1) the limited nature of constitutional rights, (2) the low
level of judicial independence; and (3) the judicial lack of implementation
power. Each of these three constraints can be overcome, however, when three
corresponding conditions are met: (1) "ample legal precedent for change"; (2)
"support for change from substantial numbers" of congressional and executive
officials; and (3) "support from some citizens, or at least low levels of
opposition from all citizens" plus at least one of four other conditions: (a)
positive incentives for compliance; (b) costs for noncompliance; (c) court
decisions allowing market implementation; or (d) the presence of crucial
implementation officials who "are willing to act and see court orders as a tool
for leveraging additional resources or for hiding behind."
44
Several problematic features of this theory should be noted at the outset,
for they will recur in the discussion that follows. First, it is radically
indeterminate. Virtually every one of the theory's key concepts-court, judicial
decision, judicial effectiveness, social change, political support and opposition,
incentives for compliance, market implementation, and official willingness to
act-is deeply ambiguous and question-begging for Rosenberg's theoretical
purposes, which are to explain and predict the consequences of Supreme Court
decisions. 45 He disclaims any intention to explicate what is his most
indeterminate yet theoretically fundamental concept of all---causality. In sum,
Rosenberg cannot escape the inherently complex nature of his subject.46
Second, Rosenberg neglects certain dynamic effects unleashed by many
Court decisions. In particular, he neglects the repetitive, dialogic nature of the
43. Lest the reader think that I am blind to the shortcomings of my own "trichotomy" (strong-court
scholarship, court skepticism, and court fatalism), let me hasten to add that I use it only for the most
limited purpose-simply to distinguish at the outset Rosenberg's approach from other scholarly approaches
that might otherwise be confused with it.
44. ROSENBERG at 35-36.
45. To cite one striking example, it is not at all clear to which "courts" his theory relates. His two
main case studies (school desegregation and abortion) focus on Supreme Court decisions; yet some of his
other examples, such as environmental litigation, deal with lower court cases. This is not a trivial ambiguity
for, as he himself notes, the Supreme Court enjoys only limited control over the lower courts. Indeed, his
own account of the lower courts' early sluggish response to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (Brown 1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11), dramatically underscores the need for clarification on
this point. See ROSENBERG at 42-71. Other examples of fundamental conceptual ambiguity are mentioned
throughout this Review.
46. Rosenberg, however, seems to feel that he has avoided this flaw; in this connection, he notes that
Stephen Wasby's 1970 book on the impact of Supreme Court decisions "suggested so many hypotheses
(one hundred and thirty-five of them) as to be of little practical help." ROSENBERG at 10 (citing STEPHEN
L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTVES (1970)).
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interactions between courts, legislatures, agencies, and other social processes,
as well as the political synergy that some litigation engenders.
Third, Rosenberg's measure of court effectiveness appears to give
excessive weight to whether litigation advances the avowed agendas of public
interest litigators and too little weight to more modest, but still significant,
reform goals and to the substantive merits of the policies at stake in the
litigation.
Finally, his theory makes no effort to differentiate between constitutional
and statutory interpretation decisions. Even if the kinds of reformist court
initiatives with which Rosenberg is concerned tend to take the former path,
statutory construction remains another significant but quite different route for
such efforts; 47 indeed, one of his case studies (environmental litigation) takes
precisely this route. Social reform through statutory interpretation has a
distinctive dynamic that produces its own patterns of cause and consequence.
To note only the most obvious difference, administrative agencies ordinarily
play central roles in effectuating statutory regimes. Their relationships to
courts, legislatures, and constituencies are pivotal in determining how judicial
doctrines are both shaped and implemented. 49  Any theory of court
effectiveness that conflates these two reform techniques, then, is bound to miss
a great deal. 0
For all these reasons, Rosenberg's theory is unpersuasive. In themselves,
however, these shortcomings do not necessarily render it valueless. After all,
a good theory can crystallize important issues, facilitating subsequent
resolution through further conceptual clarification or data-gathering. The real
test of Rosenberg's approach, then, is whether it can further these processes
of hypothesis-refining, prediction-generating, and prediction-testing in the
specific contexts to which he seeks to apply it, and hopefully in other contexts
47. For example, in 1978 the Supreme Court reversed a line of circuit court cases holding that the
procedures specified in Administrative Procedure Act § 553 provided merely a "floor" of procedural
requirements. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519
(1978); see also Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 Sup. CT. REv. 345 (1979) (describing and praising Supreme Court's rejection of D.C. Circuit's
reasoning). Antitrust law supplies other examples of judicially-initiated reform accomplished through
statutory interpretation; for example, early in this century the Supreme Court abandoned per se rules against
restraints of trade in favor of a rule of reason, shifting the focus of antitrust law from consumers to small
businesses. For a discussion of the relevant cases, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 15-49 (1978). Anti-discrimination disability law is yet another field in which
the judiciary has attempted reform by means of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., KATMANN, supra note
38.
48. ROSENBERG at 271-92.
49. See MELNICK, STATUTORY RIGHTS, supra note 8. Indeed, Melnick expressly contrasts his findings
with Rosenberg's argument. Id. (manuscript at 578 & 660 n.2).
50. Rosenberg does say that the political support necessary (but under his theory, not always sufficient)
for judicial effectiveness may exist "when legislation supportive of significant social reform has been
enacted and courts are asked to interpret it." ROSENBERG at 31. Although he does not make this point, his
claim is supported by the frequency with which Congress overrules judicial interpretations of statutes.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331
(1991).
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as well. As we shall see, his theory and analysis only partly satisfy this
criterion, for they fail at many points. On the other hand, they have already
succeeded in provoking much scholarly debate, 51 and they provide a (loose)
framework around which he can drape some very interesting, significant data
that enrich our understanding of the phenomena he discusses. Most important,
his work should stimulate more refined theories of judicial effectiveness.
Nevertheless (as I suggest in the Conclusion), to expect such theories to do
much predictive work is to indulge in a hope as hollow as that which
Rosenberg is at such pains to debunk.
A. Brown v. Board of Education
Rosenberg's first and most obvious challenge is Brown v. Board of
Education.52 This decision is usually viewed as the most famous instance of
judicial activism-and more to the point, of effective judicial activism-in the
modem history of the Supreme Court. Brown has long been celebrated by its
supporters53 and detractors5 4 alike as the fountainhead of the civil rights
movement and as a milestone of Equal Protection jurisprudence. If Rosenberg
can demonstrate that Brown actually had little effect, and that the Court's
impotence was a result of the constraints and the absence of the conditions
identified by his theory, then he will have gone a very long way toward
vindicating that theory.
Through a resourceful, imaginative, and pointed marshalling of evidence,
Rosenberg succeeds in casting serious doubt on the conventional wisdom about
Brown. In the end, however, the weaknesses of his theory prevent him from
mounting a convincing refutation. After noting the familiar fact that there was
little compliance with the decision for over a decade, he shows that when
compliance finally did come in the areas of education, voting, transportation,
public accommodations, and housing, the trigger was not Brown but civil
rights legislation authorizing federal program agencies to cut off funding to
noncomplying recipients. Anticipating the argument that Brown was
51. Reviews of The Hollow Hope include Stephen L. Carter, Book Review, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1216
(1992); Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1027 (1992); Stephen J. Kastenberg, Book Review,
29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589 (1992); David L. Kirp, Book Review, 254 NATION 757 (1992); L.A. Powe, Jr.,
supra note 10; Cass R. Sunstein, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Oct. 22, 1992, at 47.
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11).
53. See, e.g., Annual Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 130 F.R.D. 161
168 (1989) (remarks of Justice Thurgood Marshall); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in
the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982); Fiss, supra note 37; Jack Greenberg, Litigation
for Social Change: Methods, Limits and Role in Democracy, 29 REC. ASS'N B. CITY OF N.Y. 320, 337-54
(1974); HARVIE J. WILKINSON, II, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION, 1954-1978 (1979).
54. See, e.g., JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 154 (1984);
LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS
18-37 (1976); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1,
31-35 (1959).
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responsible for this legislation, he notes that its sponsors did not cite Brown
as a source of inspiration, and that Congress had been considering a similar
remedy since the 1940's.
Rosenberg's point is not that Brown was irrelevant to what followed or
that the courts were always ineffective. He surely recognizes (although he does
not say) that Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was legitimated, was
rendered compelling policy, and probably passed constitutional muster5 6 only
because Brown had already established desegregated public education as a
substantive right protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Nor does he deny
that the courts did help to enforce school desegregation after 1968.57 Rather,
his point is that the Court's contribution to the civil rights revolution depended
almost entirely on the efficacy of nonjudicial political forces and that Brown
was largely irrelevant to their emergence. Like becalmed ships, the courts
made little real headway until the mid-1960's when favorable winds generated
by independent political forces became strong enough to carry them toward
their destination. (A quarter-century later, they still are far from reaching it,
especially in the area of higher education)."
Rosenberg argues that it was the constraints identified by his theory that
operated to stymie judicial implementation of Brown in its first decade.
Political leaders at all levels opposed vigorous enforcement. Public opinion in
the South was deeply recalcitrant. The court system's own structure assured
judicial impotence. Only when those constraints began to dissolve and some
of the conditions for compliance specified by his theory were met-for
example, the creation of incentives and the willingness of local actors to use
the courts to provide political cover for their compliance-was real progress
55. ROSENBERG at 42-71 (ch. 2). For a contrary claim on the inspiration point, see Devins, supra note
51, at 1041-42. Immediately after, Rosenberg states that "[olnly after there was a major change in the
congressional climate with the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, did the Court re-enter the field."
ROSENBERG at 74. This ignores several important Supreme Court decisions decided after Brown and before
passage of the Act, including Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (enjoining public
schools from closing to avoid desegregation plan), Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963)
(disapproving desegregation plan that allowed any student to transfer out of desegregated school district),
and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (rejecting district court suspension of Little Rock school board's
plan to desegregate schools), all of which Rosenberg discusses in his second chapter.
56. Although much of the Act relied on Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce, see Heart
of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,250 (1964) (upholding Title II, the public accommodations
section, as a legitimate use of the commerce power), Title VI, which authorized the termination of federal
funds to school districts that discriminated, was premised on the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F2d 836, 856, 882 (5th Cir. 1966) (Wisdom, J.), aff'd en banc, 380
F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). In addition, Title IV provided that the
Department of Justice could itself sue to desegregate recalcitrant school districts. Thus, federal enforcement
of the norm of desegregation was at least in part directly dependent on Brown and its progeny. See Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); cf. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE
IV AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: A STUDY OF A NEGLECTED FEDERAL PROGRAM (Jan. 1973).
57. ROSENBERG at 52-54. Devins apparently misreads Rosenberg on this point. Devins, supra note 51,
at 1043-46 (discussing judicial role in period following Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430
(1968)).
58. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2734, 2746 (1992) (a recent extension of Brown to
desegregation in higher education), documents the still-segregated status of Mississippi State Universities.
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made. Only congressional and executive branch actions could dissolve these
constraints and establish these conditions, but those actions could not be
mounted until a decade after Brown.
In the meantime, the decision was essentially a dead letter. Rosenberg
marshals evidence showing that during that initial decade, press coverage of
civil rights-even in the media read by political elites and even in the black
press-did not increase or change much; indeed, there was less coverage in
those years than in some years of the 1940's. Textbooks continued to portray
blacks with the same condescension and out-and-out racism as in the pre-
Brown period. Elite attitudes appear to have been influenced little by the
decision, and the general public remained ignorant of its existence and
import.5 9 Finding little evidence that Brown had much direct effect on civil
rights enforcement during its first decade, Rosenberg flatly rejects the
traditional view of Brown as social apocalypse that American legal scholars
have propounded and propagated.60
To his credit, however, Rosenberg does not stop there. He goes on to
consider the strong-court scholars' obvious fallback position-their contention
that Brown's effects were powerful, as advertised, but indirect; that subsequent
events and additional factors mediated and obscured these indirect effects,
rendering Brown's true significance inaccessible to Rosenberg's method of
investigation. For the optimist, Brown's real contribution was to put civil rights
on the liberal political agenda, force white politicians to respond, raise public
consciousness of racial injustice, and inspire civil rights organizations and the
black community to take to the streets and the voting booths, thereby
producing the long-deferred political gains of the 1960's and 1970's. To
exemplify this view, Rosenberg quotes C. Herman Pritchett's rhetorical
question: "[I]f the Court had not taken the first giant step in 1954, does anyone
think there would now be a Civil Rights Act of 1964? ''6' Rosenberg's
intriguing court fatalist's answer is "yes." He recognizes (as he must) that even
if the strong-court scholars' indirect effects thesis were in- fact false, the
complex nature of an encompassing social upheaval like the civil rights
revolution would make it hard to rebut and impossible to refute conclusively.
Causal pathways for such phenomena are never singular and are seldom clearly
marked. 62 He deals with this problem in the only way an empiricist can,
59. ROSENBERG at 72-106 (ch. 3).
60. For quotations from sources presenting the traditional view, see ROSENBERG at 39-40.
61. Id. at 107 (quoting C. Herman Pritchett, Equal Protection and the Urban Majority, 58 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 869, 869 (1964)).
62. Or as Rosenberg puts this indeterminacy point: "Ideas seem to have feet of their own, and tracking
their footsteps is an imperfect science. Thus, even if I find little or no evidence of extra-judicial influence,
it is simply impossible to state with certainty that the Court did not produce significant social reform in
civil rights." ROSENBERG at 108.
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seeking to support his fatalistic theory factually by disproving its more
optimistic alternatives.63
Searching the record for the kind of tracks that even indirect causality
would leave, Rosenberg compares the pre- and post-Brown eras across a
stunningly broad array of political indices: legislative initiatives, congressional
debates, presidential pronouncements, political party and other elite attitudes,
citizen awareness of Brown (and other Court decisions), the volume,
motivation, and rhetoric of civil rights demonstrations, relationships among
(and funding of) civil rights organizations, and public opinion among both
blacks and whites on civil rights issues generally and on Brown in
particular.64
On this evidence (and Rosenberg adduces a great deal of it), Brown did
not "give [civil rights] salience, press political elites to act, prick the
consciences of whites, legitimate the grievances of blacks, and fire blacks up
to act."65 Especially revealing in this regard is Rosenberg's discussion of the
black community's response to Brown. He shows, for example, that the
community's knowledge of Brown was probably not widespread; that many
blacks had a lukewarm response to the decision; that protest actions, far from
being sparked by Brown, had been more common in the 1940's than in some
of the immediate post-Brown years; that Brown played a negligible role in
inspiring the Montgomery bus boycott of 1956, the sit-in movement, or the
leading black protest groups other than plaintiff's counsel (the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund); that Martin Luther King, Jr. and other leaders
outside the NAACP viewed Brown-type court actions as a formalist distraction
from a mass protest strategy; and that partly for this reason there was serious
conflict between the NAACP and the groups committed to mass protest.
66
Rather than constituting a watershed in American race relations, then,
Brown as depicted by Rosenberg was simply one point along an upward
trajectory of public sympathy toward civil rights that began in the 1930's and
steepened in the wake of World War II. In his fatalist account, this public
support achieved political takeoff only in the mid-1960's when nonjudicial
factors coalesced to create auspicious conditions for significant legislation and
more aggressive enforcement.67 Although the immediate precipitant of this
transformation was the public fear and revulsion aroused by Southern violence
against black and white demonstrators, other more structural changes had laid
the groundwork. Economic pressures against segregation had mounted;
63. He employs this technique of proof in his other case studies as well.
64. ROSENBERG at 107-56 (ch. 4).
65. Id. at 156. Indeed, by "stiffening resistance and raising fears before the activist phase of the civil
rights movement was in place," Rosenberg suggests, "Brown may actually have delayed the achievement
of civil rights." Id.
66. Id. at 131-50.
67. Id. at 107-56 (ch. 4).
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demographic and migratory shifts had concentrated black voters in pivotal,
electorally competitive states; the United States' growing international
responsibilities made state-sanctioned racism here an embarrassment; the power
of mass communications accelerated changes in public opinion.6" The Court,
whose Brown decision was already a decade old and unavailing, was merely
a midwife of racial progress, not its parent.
Although Rosenberg's data on Brown and its aftermath are intriguing and
undeniably provocative, they cannot substantiate a theory as open-ended and
indeterminate as the one that he offers. At most, the data raise important but
ultimately unanswerable questions about causality in a social context in which,
as just noted, many factors other than Brown were also at work transforming
social attitudes. These other factors presumably influenced, and were in turn
influenced by, Brown in complex ways that are simply impossible to
disentangle, though Rosenberg's is an imaginative effort.
B. Roe v. Wade
Rosenberg's analysis of the Court's first major abortion decision, Roe v.
Wade,69 is far less persuasive. It purports to exemplify a different aspect of
his theory of court fatalism-the proposition (consistent with Rosenberg's
"Dynamic Court" view) that courts can effectively propel social change if
certain conditions are met, especially the existence of widespread public
support and of market incentives for the reform. Even here, of course, the
public support condition serves to underscore Rosenberg's claim that the
Court's reformist role is essentially derivative, reinforcing, and epiphenomenal,
not initiatory and causal.
His crucial factual claims center on the observation that the number of
legal abortions, although flat in the late 1960's, began a steep, steady rise in
1970 (three years before Roe), flattening out again in 1980.70 From this he
argues that widespread availability of abortion, as well as liberal reform
activity in state legislatures and relative passivity by conservative politicians
on the issue, had already made abortion a mainstream social practice by 1973,
when Roe was decided. At that time, he says, "there was little political
opposition to abortion on the federal level, widespread support for it among
68. Id. at 157-69 (ch. 5).
69. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
70. ROSENBERG at 178-80. Thus the percentage increase, figured annually, declined steadily. Though
Rosenberg does not say so, the abortion rate (number of abortions per 1000 women age 14 to 44 years of
age) and the abortion ratio (number of abortions per 1000 live births) followed the same general pattern.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Surveillance Summaries, Abortion Surveillance-United
States, 1989, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.; vol. 41, September 4, 1992, at 3 (Figure 1), 12
(Table 2); Abortion Surveillance-United States 1990,41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 936, 937
(1992). Rosenberg's abortion figures, although compiled in part from CDC data, differ slightly from the
numbers reported by the CDC.
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relevant professional elites and social activists, large-scale use of it .... and
growing public support."'71 When the Court rendered its decision in Roe, his
argument implies, it was sailing comfortably with the wind at its back.72
Further, since the number of legal abortions increased steadily before and after
Roe, Rosenberg argues that the decision had little effect.
But Roe did, after all, invalidate forty-six state laws restricting abortion. 73
Rosenberg's explanation is that the laws that Roe struck down had been so
massively evaded that their demise had little practical effect. There are several
serious difficulties with this argument as a factual matter. As Neal Devins
points out, the pre-Roe liberalizations of state abortion laws typically had been
quite modest, leaving significant restrictions in place. 74 Thus, Roe
immediately produced far-reaching changes in the law. Nor was the pre-Roe
liberalization trend as powerful and irreversible as Rosenberg suggests. Indeed,
immediately before Roe, reform initiatives in Michigan and North Dakota had
failed. In qualitative terms as well, Roe did not simply continue the pre-Roe
state of affairs; it appears to have sharply reduced both the maternal death rate
from, and the cost of, abortions.75 To frame Roe's effect another way, it
improved the outcomes for even those women who, before the decision, would
have successfully evaded the legal restrictions on abortions.
Several interpretations that do not support Rosenberg's general theory can
explain the data he uses. An alternative explanation for the fact that the post-
Roe rise in abortions was merely linear might be the effectiveness of new
statutory restrictions that states adopted after Roe in order to circumvent the
decision. The fact that the increase in legal abortions did not flatten until after
1980-despite the new state law restrictions-is, under this explanation, what
is intriguing about the data. In addition, Rosenberg's comparison is between
pre- and post-Roe. Perhaps he should instead have attempted to compare the
world following the actual Roe decision, and the hypothetical world that would
have existed had the Supreme Court decided the case the other way. If Roe
had gone the other way, the abortion rate might have increased at a lower rate
or even declined, for evasion of state restrictions might have become more
71. ROSENBERG at 182. Later, he writes that "[iln recent times, public discussion [of abortion] did not
surface until the 1950s," Id. at 258-59, failing to note that nineteenth-century discussion of abortion was
extensive, see, e.g., CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 239 (1980); JOHN P. HARPER, "BE FRUITFUL AND MULTIPLY": THE
REACTION TO FAMILY LIMITATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1975); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION
IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978); Reva Siegel,
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 281-87 (1992) and sources there cited (describing nineteenth-century
anti-abortion advocacy of American Medical Association).
72. Even when Congress first passed its annual Hyde Amendment in 1976, severely limiting the use
of federal funds to pay for abortions, it took no direct action to prohibit abortion itself, and the pre-Roe rate
of increase continued. ROSENBERG at 187.
73. Id. at 175.
74. Devins, supra note 51, at 1057 & n.138.
75. Id., at 1057-58 and sources there cited.
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difficult than during the pre-Roe period, before the Supreme Court had spoken
decisively on the issue. Indeed, had Roe upheld state criminalization of
abortion, the burden of political inertia would have strongly, probably
decisively, favored the pro-life forces; to legalize abortions in certain states
might well have required a national constitutional amendment, which a
passionate pro-life minority almost certainly could have defeated.
Unfortunately, Rosenberg does not pursue these (and other) avenues, which
might seriously undermine, or at least require him to refine, his interpretation
of Roe's consequences.
Rosenberg notes that Roe provoked a severe backlash by abortion
opponents76 but that the number of abortion providers and legal procedures
nevertheless continued to increase after the decision, as private clinics
proliferated.77 These clinics provided market alternatives to hospital-based
abortions, which were hard to obtain since many hospitals-under pressure
from pro-life groups-refused to provide abortions even after Roe.78 From
this, Rosenberg infers that the Roe decision could not have been effective
alone. Rather, effective social change occurred as a result of the combination
of the decision with public support and the existence of market alternatives
capable of neutralizing the unavailability of hospital-based abortions.79
This inference is certainly plausible and tends to support Rosenberg's
larger theoretical structure of constraints and conditions. But since the issue of
clinic versus hospital setting is so important to Rosenberg's analysis, and since
the Roe Court (like the litigants in the case) largely ignored the question of
where abortions occur, the analysis would have been more compelling had he
taken account of the post-Roe decisions in which the Court actually did grapple
with the topic. In looking at those cases, a point and a series of questions
emerge. First, to treat the existence of market alternatives as an exogenous
factor is hardly accurate; it was the Court, after all, that refused to allow states
to confine abortions to hospitals."0 Second, how is Rosenberg's analysis
affected by subsequent court decisions permitting states to regulate clinics that
provide abortions? s' Do those decisions confirm his theory, by showing that
the reform is rendered ineffective when market alternatives are restricted? Do
76. ROSENBERG at 185-89. Devins discusses the nature and scale of this backlash in greater detail than
Rosenberg. Devins, supra note 51, at 1059-60.
77. ROSENBERG at 195-98.
78. Id. at 189-90. Although Rosenberg does not cite data on hospital practices prior to 1973, he
implies that the limited availability of hospital abortions may have preceded Roe. Id. (referring to hospitals
that have never performed abortions). This suggests that the post-Roe backlash may not have been this
pattern's cause.
79. Id. at 199-201.
80. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,434-39 (1983) (state may not require
that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462
U.S. 476, 481-82 (1983) (same).
81. See, e.g., Simopoulas v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 518 (1983) (state may require that second trimester
abortions be provided either in hospitals or licensed outpatient clinics); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976) (upholding recordkeeping requirements for clinics that provide abortions).
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they refute it, by showing that as a result of public law litigation and judicial
action, the number of abortions did not decrease despite these restrictions?82
Or do they (as I think) show that the theory's formulation is too ambiguous to
be very useful either in clarifying the relevant concepts or in yielding testable,
refutable propositions?
83
Three examples amply illustrate the importance of this last question. First,
Rosenberg's theory fails to tell us whether the reformist "court decision" to
which he is applying the theory is simply Roe, or also includes the series of
decisions that have purported to elaborate Roe, such as Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services.84 Why should his analysis be confined to Roe
when the legal culture, and most certainly the Court, correctly assumes that
such a decision merely initiates a long process through which a principle is
elaborated and given content through specific and repeated applications?
Second, the theory fails to tell us how to identify the "effects" of a decision
like Roe-clearly a necessary precedent to appraising its "effectiveness." How
did it alter the complex balance of political forces affecting not only future
court decisions but state and federal legislative struggles, litigants' strategies,
and private behaviors? Again, social reality is far too complex for post hoc
ergo propter hoc reasoning about causality.
Finally, at the end of his discussion of the abortion cases, Rosenberg draws
the following lesson: "[A]s with civil rights, the Court is far less responsible
for the changes that occurred than most people think." 85 Yet, once again, if
we try to imagine what abortion practices would have been like had Roe been
decided the other way (rather than merely not decided), it seems plain that
neither his theory nor his facts establish even this general proposition. It is one
thing to say that Roe reinforced pro-abortion forces that were already in train,
quite another to say that a contrary decision in Roe would not have much
affected the course of abortion policy. If Rosenberg is saying the latter when
he diminishes the Court's responsibility for the continuing availability of legal
abortions, then it is hard to credit the claim.
C. Other Legal Areas
Rosenberg extends his analysis to other categories of cases, but because
his treatment of these is more summary and less interesting, I shall discuss
them only briefly. His approach in each of these case categories is flawed by
one or more of the four problematic features of his theory noted earlier.86 His
82. See sources cited supra note 70.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46 for a list of some of the crucial ambiguities in the
theory.
84. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
85. ROSENBERG at 201.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
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discussion of women's rights (other than abortion) suffers both from the
indeterminacy of the theory, and from his tendency to depreciate the courts'
effectiveness by measuring it according to the agenda of the groups initiating
the cases rather than more modest, albeit important, goals. His analysis of
these cases is also confusing in other ways. He first contends that although the
Court struck down many (but not all) gender-based distinctions during the
1970's and early 1980's,1 7 and the other branches moved simultaneously to
enlarge and enforce these antidiscrimination principles, little progress was
made against wage discrimination because of the persistence of cultural
barriers, family structure-based disadvantages, and other factors."8 He also
maintains, however, that a "tide of history" comprised of economic,
demographic, educational, technological, ideological, and other factors has
produced great gains for women in almost all areas.89 Finally, he shows that
there is little evidence-in media coverage, political activity, public opinion,
or the growth and funding of the women's movement-that the Court's
decisions had much to do with whatever gains women did make. He argues
that this confirms his theory: "[N]one of the conditions allowing for Court
effectiveness," he says, "are regularly present with women's rights."
90
Here again, the theory is so ill-specified that it is hard to know how to
evaluate his application of it to women's rights. Is the fact that so-called
"comparable worth" claims have not been judicially recognized (Rosenberg's
major example of lack of progress) evidence that courts are ineffective
reformers, or is it simply evidence that, for better or for worse, they have not
chosen to define the right to nondiscrimination to include this conception of
pay equity?9' If the latter, it seems wrongheaded to charge them with being
ineffective at achieving a goal, comparable worth, that they never adopted as
part of the reform they did embrace, and that many commentators, including
some who support that goal, think courts (as distinguished from legislatures or
agencies) are poorly equipped to achieve.92
87. The most notable exceptions concerned statutory rape laws, in Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding statutory rape law that applied only to persons who had sex with females under
eighteen years old), and the draft, in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding Selective Service
Act's application to men only). See ROSENBERG at 204 n.9.
88. ROSENBERG at 202-27 (ch. 7). The data on women's progress in wages during the 1980's support
a far more upbeat view than Rosenberg's. See, e.g., Sylvia Nasar, Women's Progress Stalled? Just Not So,
N.Y. TIMES, October 18, 1992, § 3, at 1.
89. ROSENBERG at 247-65 (ch. 9).
90. Id. at 213.
91. Proponents of comparable worth argue that women are systemically underpaid when they work
in typically female job categories, if salaries are compared to typically male jobs of comparable "worth,"
determined by looking at job skills, duties, etc. The attractiveness of comparable worth as a policy is far
more controversial than Rosenberg seems to realize. See, e.g., JENNIFER ROBACK, A MATmrER OF CHOICE:
A CRITIQUE OF COMPARABLE WORTH BY A SKEPTICAL FEMINIST (1986).
92. See, e.g., HENRY J. AARON & CAMERAN M. LOUGY, THE COMPARABLE WORTH CONTROVERSY
(1986).
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Rosenberg's discussion of environmental cases exemplifies all four of the
problematic features noted earlier: theoretical indeterminacy, neglect of
important political dynamics unleashed by court decisions, measurement of
reform effectiveness according to the litigators' most ambitious goals, and the
failure to differentiate between constitutional and statutory interpretation by
courts. Here too, his discussion is puzzling, and not simply because most of
the cases that he cites are (unlike those in the earlier chapters) decisions by
lower courts. First, he cites the failure of the courts to constitutionalize the
right to a healthy environment as evidence of the ineffectiveness of court-
initiated reform, predictable on the basis of his theory's constraints and
conditions. 93 He does not consider the possibility that no such right was
created because it was in fact a demonstrably bad idea, difficult if not
impossible to justify on doctrinal, policy, or political grounds.94 Nor does he
consider that the court's role in interpreting environmental statutes is altogether
different, and far more consequential, than its failure to constitutionalize
environmental rights.
Next, he finds that the courts had "varying success" in enforcing
environmental laws.95 As in the gender discrimination area, this mixed verdict
enables him to claim vindication for his theory, with its mixture of unspecified
(hence analytically slippery) constraints and conditions. Moreover, his notion
of judicial effectiveness here seems especially unsatisfactory; the criterion
seems to be whether the courts agreed with the claims of environmental
groups, not whether the courts' decisions had the beneficial policy results that
Congress presumably intended.96 This latter standard is more appropriate;
further, applying it can yield even better, more substantive reasons to doubt the
courts' effectiveness than Rosenberg adduces. Some detailed studies of court-
regulatory agency interactions, for example, find that courts tend to be poor
environmental policymakers whose decisions can often degrade, rather than
improve, environmental conditions.97
Rosenberg's strategic point-which converges with Gerald L6pez's
argument-is that environmentalists (and other reformers) should not look to
the courts for much help but should instead invest their resources in political
93. ROSENBERG at 271-73.
94. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 89-91 (1990).
95. ROSENBERG at 285.
96. See, e.g., id. at 284-85.
97. See, e.g., MELNICK, REGULATION, supra note 8; JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF ToxIc
SUBSTANCE REGULATION (1988). Rosenberg cites Melnick, ROSENBERG at 278, but appears not to have
read him carefully; Rosenberg sees courts' "lack [of] meaningful independence from the other branches"
as the reason for environmental litigation's ineffectiveness, id. at 279, while Melnick sees the problem as
courts' inadequate attention to the needs of the other branches, especially the implementing agencies. As
for Mendeloff's study, Rosenberg does not include it even in his general bibliography.
Scholars have also found perverse, unanticipated consequences from court decisions outside the
environmental area. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NAT'L TAX J.
465 (1989).
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mobilization and legislative lobbying. Courts, he concludes, simply "preserve
victories achieved in the political realm from attack. But preservation, while
important, is only useful when there are victories to preserve. And
environmental litigation, as a strategy for producing a clean and healthy
environment, achieved precious few victories." ''g For several reasons,
however, this seems a dubious balance sheet on environmental litigation since
the early 1970's. First, environmental groups have in fact won many victories
in the courts during this period, as industry and government litigators will
ruefully attest. The harder, more significant question (as noted above) is
whether those victories were actually good for the environment, a question
about which Rosenberg shows little sustained interest. 99 Second, there can be
little question that environmental litigation was effective in helping to slow,
and occasionally to defeat, the Reagan-Bush deregulatory juggernaut, and in
helping to build up membership in environmental action organizations."
00
More generally, his argument moves from the undeniable fact that
reformers' resources are limited, so that public law litigation must compete for
those resources with other forms of political activity conducted in nonjudicial
forums, to what appears to be an implicit but far more doubtful assumption
about the process of social reform. He writes that "the courts also limit change
by deflecting claims from substantive political battles, where success is
possible, to harmless legal ones where it is not."'0 ' The process of social
change, however, is not a zero-sum game in which efforts initiated by courts
and in other quarters are competitive rather than complementary. It is true, of
course, that court-initiated change may generate a political backlash that can
defeat or at least impede the reform enterprise, as with the abortion
controversy. But this particular dynamic hardly exhausts the range of
interactions between courts and politics, many of which are synergistic with
respect to both substantive reform and political resources. Here as elsewhere
in the book, Rosenberg's gnosticism concerning how social change actually
occurs weakens the persuasiveness of his analysis.
In a very brief discussion of reapportionment litigation, Rosenberg likens
his findings to those in the environmental area: "A procedural victory was won
but one that didn't automatically lead to substantive ends. Legislatures were
reapportioned, but the reformers' liberal agenda did not then automatically
98. ROSENBERG at 292.
99. The closest he comes to addressing this question is one paragraph that summarizes the results of
environmental action as "decidedly mixed," and a footnote that refers the reader to the Council on
Environmental Quality annual reports. Id. at 275.
100. See JONATHAN LASH ET AL., A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S ATrACK
ON THE ENVIRONMENT (1984); PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (1993). Again, the extent to which these tactics actually improved the
environment and whether they were cost-effective from a purely organizational perspective are separate and
quite difficult questions on which Rosenberg sheds little light.
101. ROSENBERG at 341.
17831993]
The Yale Law Journal
come to pass."'1 2 To imply that any reform is ineffective unless it can
produce an "automatic" success is patently unreasonable, of course; I know of
no reform that would satisfy it. Nevertheless, Rosenberg does make some
telling points about how politicians have managed to mute the effects of
reapportionment. 0 3 He goes on, however, to ignore a characteristic aspect
of reapportionment litigation that is inconvenient for his theory and conclusion.
Compared to the other areas that Rosenberg analyzes, court implementation of
reapportionment decrees is easy; the court can either enjoin the election until
a satisfactory districting plan is adopted or draw the plan itself.'°4
The final sphere of litigation discussed by Rosenberg is criminal justice
reform-more specifically, the rights of prisoners and juveniles, the
exclusionary rule, and the right to counsel.'05 Here again, his verdict is that
the courts have been only partly effective in these areas ("problems still
abound"'0 6) and that his theory of constraints and conditions explains why.
Indeed, despite the theoretical shortcomings already noted, his analysis seems
more persuasive as applied to the criminal justice system-in which all of the
effectiveness constraints and none of the conditions prescribed by the theory
ordinarily obtain' 07 -than to any of the other areas that he considers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rebellious Lawyering and The Hollow Hope share an important insight.
Liberal activist courts are not as effective in producing enduring social change
as many of their proponents would wish. Partly because of this, L6pez urges
"progressive" lawyers (he tends to avoid the terms "liberal" or "radical") to put
their energies and resources elsewhere-into community organizing and
political mobilization.0 8 He also conjures up a vision of lawyering that all
102. Id. at 297-98.
103. Id. at 296-302. On this point, see also Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan
Gerrymandering and the Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325 (1987).
104. I should not be misunderstood as suggesting that enjoining an election is unproblematic (for
example, it may keep incumbents in office beyond the term for which they were elected) or that drawing
a districting map is straightforward (there are numerous politically sensitive choices to be made). See
Schuck, supra note 103. My point is only that courts can-for better or for worse-do reapportionment
essentially alone (with the help of special masters), unlike in the other areas studied. In terms of
Rosenberg's theory, then, the third of the structural constraints limiting courts' ability to effect social
change, the (normal) judicial lack of implementation power, is not present. See supra text accompanying
note 44.
105. ROSENBERG at 304-35 (ch. 11).
106. Id. at 307.
107. See id. at 307-13. Rosenberg discerns more political support for prison reform than I do, at least
if reform is not understood as prison construction. See id. at 308-09.
108. I say "partly" because I suspect that even if court-ordered change could be more effectively
implemented, L6pez might nonetheless prefer the kind of "bottom-up" reform practices that he discusses
on the grounds that they are more authentic representations of what community people actually want, more
effective techniques for achieving their personal self-realization, and more successful modes of political
mobilization.
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lawyers should find challenging and that some will even find inspirational. He
makes no large theoretical claims, however, about courts or about their
connection to social change.
Rosenberg, in contrast, is preoccupied with these questions. He insists that
"a great deal of writing about courts is fundamentally flawed,"'0 9 and he is
correct. His own book is less about courts than about other political forces that
surround and intersect with courts: public opinion, other government
institutions, the media, and private organizations. Herein lies The Hollow
Hope's greatest value. It reminds us of a fact so obvious that only a subculture
as parochial and self-absorbed (I am tempted to say autistic) as contemporary
legal education and scholarship could possibly miss it: in the world of public
law, the problems that reach courts are problems that the larger society has
already been working on longer, with richer and more varied instruments, and
in more comprehensive, systemic-hence more intractable-contexts." 0 The
evidence that Rosenberg mobilizes to illuminate this fact is arresting,
resourcefully compiled, and for the most part convincing; so far as I know, use
of such evidence in this way is novel. One hopes that other commentators,
especially legal scholars who pontificate about the social effects of legal
decisions, will emulate and perhaps improve upon his techniques in the future.
When Rosenberg turns to analyzing the relationships between courts and
these other political forces, however, his work is of considerably less value and
may even be misleading. His court fatalism seems largely oblivious to the
dialogic, sequential, iterative quality of court-society interactions in important
public law cases,"' a quality so elegantly elaborated by Alexander Bickel
and applied by those scholars who have followed in the Bickelian
tradition." 2  Rosenberg's theory of constraints and conditions, while
identifying factors that are undeniably significant in determining judicial
effectiveness, adds little that scholars literate in the political science of judicial
behavior and policy implementation do not already know,"3 and it is in any
event too ill-specified to be either fruitful or refutable.
It bears repeating, however, that any theory of judicial effectiveness is
likely to suffer from these defects--or others at least as disabling. The many
109. ROSENBERG at 342.
110. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 38.
111. For a more detailed criticism of Rosenberg on this ground, see Devins, supra note 51, at 1030,
1046-54 (listing examples of effective court-initiated changes in race area effected through dialogic
process).
112. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); HARRY H.
WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1990); Fiss, supra note 37. See also SCHUCK, SUING
GOVERNMENT, supra note 38, at 169-81.
113. A possible exception to this is his emphasis on the extent to which court decisions allow market
alternatives, to which policy analysts are sensitive but many other scholars are not. For an example of legal
analysis that recognizes the significance of this factor, see Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth ofIntent in Equal
Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1139-42 (1989). As mentioned at text accompanying supra notes 79-
82, Rosenberg's own discussion of the market alternatives factor is not wholly satisfactory.
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threads of causality are simply too tightly knotted to disentangle. The
phenomenon of judicial effectiveness is far too complex to be captured in any
transparent model. It is too contingent on the social context, political stakes,
incentive and enforcement structure, level of rule specificity, power of the
court's underlying theory of social action, particular policy domain, and other
factors that are too numerous, hard to measure, or even ineffable to lend
themselves to social science testing.
This is not a counsel of despair, however-only a plea for caution in the
making of strong scholarly claims about causal efficacy, or lack of it, in public
law. To say that Rosenberg's theory about judicial effectiveness in large-scale
social reform fails to persuade is not to say that some competing theory has
thereby been vindicated. Although I believe that the court skeptics, rather than
the strong-court scholars or the court fatalists, have the best of the argument,
a rueful candor compels me to add that we skeptics, like our competitors, are
guided more by our professionally honed, often intuitive grasp of an elusive
social reality than by any robust scientific theory worthy of the name.
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